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ABSTRACT:  Using a data set published by the Universities and Colleges Admissions Service 
(UCAS), patterns of demand and supply for higher education courses from 1996-97 to 1999-00 
are analysed. Most universities saw a fall in applications and enrolments following the 
introduction of tuition fees and maintenance loans, though this effect varies across 
institutions and regions of the UK. A model of applications and acceptances is developed and 
tested. Applications are sensitive to each institutions entry standards, reputation and location 
in the UK. Acceptances depend on teaching funding per head and the number of funded 
places each institution is given. 
 
Introduction 
This paper identifies the recent trends in Higher Education (HE) recruitment, mainly 
through a data set published by the Universities and Colleges Admissions Service (UCAS). A 
series of total applications and acceptances from 1996-97 to 1999-00 is constructed for 97 
leading UK universities.  Patterns of applications and acceptances are compared over time, 
between institutions and regions of the UK.  Although interesting, broad patterns alone 
cannot explain why some institutions are more popular than others and if students are 
attracted to particular regions.  Because applications and acceptances are part of a larger 
system, a model of applications and acceptances  is developed and estimated.  This helps cast 
light on the impact, if any, of tuition fees, which were introduced in 1998/99.   
From the mid 1980s, HE in the UK experienced a rapid expansion. Between 1983-84 and 
1993-94, there was a 54% growth, with the majority taking place among full-time 
undergraduates, which grew by 67% (HEFCE, 2001a) (see figure 1). After this, growth was 
more modest, with total student numbers increasing by 6% between 1996-97 and 2000-01. The 
main cause of this expansion was the growth in the number of 18-21 year olds taking 
university courses. The age participation index rose from 15% in 1983-84 to 30% in 1993-94 
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(see figure 2). Participation by mature students has also increased. An ambitious target of 50% 
participation for the 18-30 age group has been set by the government for 2010. However, 
which qualifications are to be included in the definition of HE (THES, 2001) is still being 
reviewed.  This may make any comparisons with the above trends spurious. 
 
Figures 1 and 2 near here 
HEFCE (2001a) suggest a number of reasons for the growth in student numbers. First, the 
introduction of the General Certificate of Secondary Education (GCSE) in 1988 (normally 
taken by students at age 16) improved the staying-on rate after compulsory schooling, 
through an increase in academic attainment at 16 (see also Mcintosh, 2001; McVicar and Rice, 
2001). Secondly, structural changes in the UK economy, particularly the expansion of the 
service sector, increased the demand for graduate labour. Managerial class employment has 
increased while the number of unskilled jobs has fallen. Moreover, some traditional 
non-graduate jobs have been upgraded to graduate status, since they are now more likely to 
be filled by degree holders.  One reason for the rise in income inequality from the late 1970s 
onwards has been the rise in the graduate premium over less qualified labour and there is 
greater awareness that `graduateness’ is a key factor in labour market success (see Blundell et 
al., 1997).  High unemployment in the 80s and early 90s was also an important push factor, 
especially for ethnic minorities who are strong demanders for HE (see Johnes and Taylor, 
1989; Leslie and Drinkwater, 1999; Leslie et al. 2002).   
 
Teaching funding is allocated to UK universities according to the number of students each 
recruits. Recruitment targets have increased since the mid 1980s. For example, the Maximum 
Aggregate Student Number (MASN)1 set by the Higher Education Funding Council of 
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England (HEFCE) for all HE Institutions (HEIs) grew by 19% between 1994-95 and 2000-01, 
from 695,434 to 825,341 places (HEFCE, 2001a). However, cumulative enrolments fell short by 
21,982 and in the last academic year (2000-01) alone some 14,465 funded places remained 
unfilled (see figure 3).  The post-1992 (‘new’) universities2 have experienced the most 
difficulty in maintaining current recruitment levels (The Times, 2001). This has created major 
funding problems, because many of them expanded during the 1980s to meet the general rise 
in student demand.  Many universities currently experience difficulties in balancing their 
budgets (HEFCE, 2001b). 
 
Participating in HE has become more expensive.  Students contribute to the cost of university 
education through the payment of tuition fees and maintenance loans.   Non-means tested 
maintenance loans were introduced in 1990/91 to partially replace means tested maintenance 
grants, although tuition remained free.   Grants remained frozen until 1994/95 with a further 
shift to a loan element to replace grants.  Tuition fees, set at £1000, further increased direct 
costs in 1998.    Tuition fees are charged at a flat rate and students can be either fully or 
partially exempt.  Students are eligible for either all or part of the maintenance loan, which is 
repaid after graduation at a zero real interest rate, subject to achieving a minimum salary.   
Tuition fees should not be seen as a major expense, when the overall costs of education are 
considered.  Foregone earnings are a far bigger cost and the results will show that there was 
in fact little or no impact on applications.  The major effect was on acceptances.   
Figure 3 near here 
 
The applications process 
 
Approximately 400,000 applicants per annum apply to UCAS for undergraduate courses 
offered on behalf of 260 UK HEIs, covering around 42,000 separate courses.  Postgraduate and 
part-time students apply to universities directly.  The UCAS process is summarized in figure 
                                                          
2 Post-1992 (‘new’) universities refer to those institutions that were granted university status following 
the removal of the divide between the former polytechnics and the pre-1992 (‘old’) universities. 
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4.  The system is competitive and each applicant is allowed to make up to six applications 
(four in medicine), at the same or different institutions (usually by the beginning of January in 
the year they propose to go to university).   So in what follows the difference between an 
applicant (one person) and an application (up to six per person) should be noted.  The 
institutions then make offers, which can be either conditional (i.e. subject to achieving the 
entry requirements) or unconditional. Applicants make a first (firm) choice and second 
(insurance) choice. Applicants without any offers automatically enter the clearing process. 
 
The majority of UK applicants receive conditional offers and only know whether they are 
accepted after receiving the results of their post-16 qualifications.3 They may be accepted by 
either their firm or insurance offers. However, applicants without any unconditional offers 
enter the clearing process, which runs from late August to early October. Institutions who 
have failed to achieve their target number of students advertise course vacancies and 
applicants contact institutions directly. Applicants can only accept one of the clearing offers 
they receive, after which they leave the admissions system. Overall, 76.7% of UK applicants 
were successful over the period 1996-2000. 
Figure 4 near here 
 
Market Trends 
UCAS publishes a data set (see www.ucas.ac.uk) on applications and acceptances to courses 
offered by the HEIs who are members. The focus is on the leading 97 UK universities for 
which a measure of quality is available, and those applicants classified as UK domiciled, 
which account for 75.5% of all applications made through UCAS and 74.5% of acceptances, 
from 1996-2000. 
 
                                                          
3 The majority are Advanced (A) levels, Scottish Highers or the General National Vocational 
Qualification (GNVQ) Advanced. From September 2000, post-16 qualifications are assessed over two 
years. Entry requirements are converted into a UCAS tariff, whereby points are awarded for the 
qualifications and grades obtained. This change does not affect the data set, which ends at 1999-2000. 
 5
Table 1 ranks institutions according to the total number of applications and acceptances each 
receives.4 Many institutions experienced fluctuating demand, with applications rising from 
1996-97 to 1997-98 and then falling between 1997-98 and 1998-99. Many applicants in the 
1997-98 academic year may have decided not to postpone university entry (e.g. to take a gap 
year) to avoid paying tuition fees.  31 out of the 40 institutions experienced more than a 5% 
absolute change in applications between 1996 and 1999, and 35 institutions had more than a 
5% absolute change in acceptances. 37 institutions experienced either higher growth in 
acceptances than applications or a smaller fall in acceptances compared to applications. 
 
Among the highest 20 institutions for applications, 12 are pre-92 institutions whereas for 
acceptances 11 are post-92 institutions. The summary statistics suggest that, while the pre-92 
sector receives more applications, the number of applications per institution is slightly higher 
among the post-92 sector. However, the number of acceptances per institution is far higher 
for the new universities. The most popular institutions in terms of applications tend to be 
located in the North of England and the Midlands. This is most likely explained by the 
relatively cheap cost of living in these regions. From the Greater London and South East 
regions, 8 institutions are among those with the lowest applications and 9 are among those 
with the lowest acceptances.  These trends are indicative.   A complete model of applications 
and acceptances is needed, which is discussed in the next section. 
Table 1 near here 
Table 2 ranks institutions by the growth in applications and acceptances they experienced 
between 1996-97 and 1999-00. 12 of the most improving institutions for applications are from 
the pre-92 sector, whereas 12 with the most improving growth in acceptances are post-92 
universities. Brunel University has experienced significantly higher growth than others, 
which is partly explained by its 1995 merger with the West London Institute of Higher 
Education. 8 out of the highest 20 institutions experiencing the highest growth in applications 
and acceptances are located in Greater London and the South East. 
                                                          
4 The highest 20 and lowest 20 positions are presented. Complete tables are available at  
 6
Table 2 near here 
 
University league tables often use the ratio of applications to acceptances as an indicator of 
the competition for places.  This measure has weaknesses, notably it assumes that each 
institution achieves its target number of acceptances.  Secondly, as the model of the next 
section makes clear, applications and acceptances are endogenous, dependent for example on 
entrance standards, so it is not apparent what the ratio of two endogenous variables actually 
means.  Nevertheless, this measure is presented in table 3.  Not surprisingly, 19 out of the 
highest 20 institutions are from the pre-92 sector.  The only exception is Thames Valley 
University, which experienced an 87.3% rise in the ratio over the sample period. This outlier 
can be explained by a fall in acceptances (-43.0%) rather than a large increase in applications 
(only up 6.7%) from 1996-97 to 1999-00 (see table 1). Among those 20 institutions with the 
lowest application to acceptance ratio, 13 are post-92 institutions and many have experienced 
a fall in the level of their acceptances. Oxford and Cambridge universities also appear  in the 
lowest 20. This result is peculiar to these two ‘elite’ institutions and demonstrates a self-
selection effect, whereby only the brightest students who are confident of securing a place at 
these institutions consider applying.  These two outliers also re-inforce the need for a formal 
model of applications and acceptances. 
Table 3 near here 
 
Table 4 presents total applications and acceptances by region. Greater London attracts the 
most applications and acceptances but also has the most institutions located within it. 
Relatively, the North West and Yorkshire & Humberside do well given the number of 
institutions located in these regions. 11 out of the 12 regions experienced a rise in applications 
between 1996-97 and 1997-98, prior to the introduction of tuition fees.  Wales, the North West 
and the North East experienced significant reductions in applications between 1997-98 and 
1998-99. Over the full sample period all regions experienced a rise in acceptances.  Except for 
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the Eastern region, the growth in acceptances was greater than the rise in applications, a 
finding confirmed by the results presented in table 1. 
Table 4 near here 
 
Theoretical framework 
Clearly, it would be a difficult task to model each detail of the complex decision process 
shown in figure 4, since little of what transpires will be recorded for analysis. There is 
information on the total applications - the basic demand input - and the final outcomes, 
namely the total acceptances to each educational institution and course 
 
A three-equation model is proposed to model the acceptance and application process. This 
will consist of a demand equation (applications), a supply equation (acceptances) and a 
market clearing condition. The third endogenous variable in this three equation approach will 
be the realized average entry grade for the institution. In simple terms the idea is that an 
institution that wishes to expand, ceteris paribus, will be required to drop its entry standards. 
Similarly, raising entry standards can ration supply. Table 5 shows the average entry 
standards for the highest 20  and the lowest 20 institutions. 
Table 5 near here 
The demand for courses ( itAP ) is defined as: 
),( 1 ititit ZPAP −ƒ=      ( 1 ) 
The demand equation is specified for each institution i, where i=1,…..,97 and for the four 
years of entry t=1,2,3,4. itAP is the number of places demanded for courses offered by 
institution i at time period t. 1−itP  is the lagged entry standard of the institution (which might 
be thought of as roughly equivalent to the price variable in an elementary economics textbook 
exposition of the market supply and demand model). A good initial hypothesis is that 
applications should  be responsive to entry grades (in lagged form), but whether this actually 
turns out to be the case is a moot point. The reason for this doubt reflects the institutional 
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structure of the admissions process. If applicants were limited to just one application, then the 
case for negative demand price elasticity would be clearer.  There is a hierarchy of ability 
among applicants, and each has some idea of how well they are likely to do in their 
examinations.  If there were just a ‘one-shot’ chance then only the most able and confident 
would apply for the hardest courses. A downward sloping demand equation might be 
expected in this case. But with up to six applications permitted and the fact that clearing 
offers a second chance, the picture is blurred somewhat.5 
 
There may be a Veblen good effect. Courses with high entrance standards may attract more 
applications because of a `prestige effect’ and the Veblen good effect is more likely if 
applicants can make several applications, as is the case under the UCAS system. It is clear that 
admissions officers do to some extent engage in this complex problem of signalling quality. If 
the bid price is lowered this may actually reduce applications because this sends a signal of 
poor quality. It is also clear that institutions would quickly lose credibility if offer prices and 
market clearing prices were to diverge significantly.6  Against this, institutions with low 
entrance standards may attract additional applications because of the insurance choice effect. 
Thus the impact of entry grades on applications remains ambiguous. The justification for 
lagging this variable is that applications are made prior to the realized entry grade being 
known. Furthermore, advertised entry requirements are only indicative, many institutions 
will drop grade requirements during clearing.   
 
itZ  is a vector of shift variables, which includes a quality ranking variable and dummy 
variables to represent pre- and post-92 universities, Oxbridge entry, year of entry and regions 
of the UK where each institution is located.  The quality ranking variable is described in table 
6 for the highest and lowest 20 institutions, and excludes entrance grades from the measure. 
                                                          
5 Leslie (2002) presents a theoretical model based on expected utility maximisation, which suggests that 
applicants will apply for courses with higher entry requirements if they have higher ability. The choice 
problem is that decisions must be made in advance of the grades being known for the typical applicant. 
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Table 6 near here 
The position of an institution in published league tables may favourably influence the 
number of applications it receives. The ‘new’/’old’ university dummy allows for differences 
in the pattern of applications between the pre- and post-92 universities.  Also Oxford and 
Cambridge universities appear to be special cases, in that that they receive comparatively 
fewer applications compared to other ‘elite’ institutions – there is a definite `why bother to 
apply?’ effect at work illustrated by well publicised rejection of candidates with highest A-
levels but not apparently made of the `right stuff’.  Regional dummies are needed given the 
conclusions from table 3, suggesting that demand for places could be affected by the location 
of an institution within the UK. Year dummies account for time differences not otherwise 
explained, for example the impact of the introduction of tuition fees in 1998 as well as secular 
trends in HE popularity. 
 
Supply ( itAC ) is specified as: 
),,( itititit XPAPgAC =     ( 2 ) 
where itP  is the current entry standard and itX  is a vector of exogenous variables that 
influence supply. APit is included since the number of acceptances is conditional on the 
number of applications. Both Pit and Xit are instrumented, using the remaining exogenous 
variables in the system as instruments. and Included in Xit is the MASN for each institution, 
its total teaching funding per head and dummy variables for Oxbridge entry, pre-92 vs. post-
92 institutions and the year of entry.  The MASN is used for each institution since any change 
in the institution’s recruitment target is likely to be reflected in a change in institutional 
acceptances. Higher teaching funding per head may act as an incentive for a university to 
accept more students. A dummy for Oxbridge is included.   For many institutions beyond a 
certain level of acceptances the supply curve is effectively vertical.  Consequently the price 
                                                                                                                                                                      
6 However, Oxbridge, which has very high entry standards (see table 5), does not attract a 
disproportionate number of applications relative to acceptances (see table 3), so the Veblen good effect 
may be exaggerated. 
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will simply rise to whatever level is required to clear the market. In terms of the supply and 
demand model there is a short-run vertical supply schedule. If demand shifts to the right, all 
the adjustment takes place in a rising price, which then clears the market. There is, however, a 
maximum price and beyond that other ways of rationing are needed (interviewing etc) – table 
5 suggests this maximum value effect for Oxbridge, which traditionally does a lot of pre-
screening of applicants.  Whether the institution is a ‘new’ or ‘old’ university is also likely to 
influence the level of acceptances (see tables 1 and 2).  Dummy variables for the year of entry 
are also included. 
 
In this model the realized average entry grade will adjust to clear the market. Institutions who 
fail to recruit enough students relative to target have the option of adjusting their entry 
requirements, whereas institutions that have popular courses will raise the entry standard to 
ration the available supply but this is subject to certain institutional constraints (discussed 
later). So grades are endogenous  in the education model in the same way price is 
endogenous in the basic supply and demand framework. This is why the raw 
application/acceptance data of Table 3 has to be carefully interpreted because both variables 
are endogenous. The low application to acceptance ratio of Oxbridge is not symptomatic of 
failure – witness once again the high entrance standards of table 5. 
 
The entry grade variable may not be freely flexible as the equivalent price variable in the 
simple supply and demand model; rather, there is probably a ratchet effect in operation. 
Typically courses/institutions will make bid prices or offer grades. Any applicant who 
reaches the prescribed grade is guaranteed a place. If a greater number than expected  reaches 
the prescribed grade, the institution is obliged to increase the supply of places to meet the 
demand – there have only been very rare instances when institutions renege on offers. So 
there are difficulties in an institution making a short-run rise in its price to ration demand. 
What it can do is raise the bid price in future years. However, no such institutional constraint 
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is present on the downside to increase supply, other than a negative effect on the credibility 
of the institution. There is an upper but no lower bound constraint in the short run.7 
 
Ideally institutions would wish to meet a set target (with a limited flexibility either way) 
without recourse to clearing. However, because of the obligation to meet demand at the offer 
price, there is strong pressure not to underbid the offer price. So the offer price is likely to be 
optimistic if anything. Clearing can actually be seen as a rational response to this institutional 
constraint. Nevertheless it is a fact of life that it is the less prestigious institutions that more 
readily use clearing to clear the market.  The 2001/02 round suggests that  universities are 
using clearing more frequently, which is squeezing the less prestigious institutions even 
more. 
 
The educational model cannot, however, be completed by simply adding the equilibrium 
condition itit APAC =  as in the simple supply and demand model. There are three reasons 
for this: 
1. Applications are not synonymous with individuals, whereas acceptances are. Each 
applicant can make up to six applications.  So, even in the absence of factors 2 and 3 
considered below, market clearing would be associated with around six applications 
for each acceptance. 
2. Not all applicants are accepted. Market clearing is not synonymous with each 
applicant being accepted, as in the supply and demand model.  Should the approach 
be better termed as an excess demand model?  Not necessarily, because in the supply 
and demand model, the demand variable is the satisfied demand. There would be 
less satisfied demand if the price rose. Here applications will include some whose 
demand will not be satisfied because they achieve a grade below the market clearing 
level for the particular course/institution that they are prepared to enter. Unlike the 
                                                          
7 But note the realized grade may rise even though all obligations are met because an unexpected 
number of entrants significantly exceed the offer price. 
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simple supply and demand model, this unsatisfied demand is included in the 
application data. 
3. A more subtle reason is that the education model is more akin to a first-degree 
discriminating monopolist, rather than a competitive market. So even if factors 1 and 
2 did not hold, there still would not be a simple market clearing condition. In the 
supply and demand model, there is one single universal price charged to all. In the 
education model, the market clearing price is a marginal price `charged to’ the lowest 
qualified candidate that clears the market.  Non-marginal candidates will have 
grades at least as good as the marginal grade.  Consequently the average grade 
(which is what is observed) will typically exceed the marginal grade that clears the 
market.   
 
In summary, the third market clearing equation is a relationship between price, applications 
and acceptances, which must account for the above factors. No attempt will be made to 
estimate this third latent equation, but the discussion emphasises that applications and entry 
grades should be treated as endogenous in the acceptance equation. The applications 
equation can be estimated by OLS because it contains only one lagged dependent variable in 
the regressor list. 
 
5. Estimation results 
Equations (1) and (2) were estimated by pooling observations on the 97 UK universities 
over the four years of entry, where figure 5 summarises the variables used.8   A log-linear 
specification was adopted so coefficients give elasticities.  In the applications equation, 
Greater London was the default region and 1996-97 the default time dummy. 
Figure 5 near here 
 
                                                          
8 There were 387 observations because no entry grade data were available for SOAS in 1996. 
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The OLS estimation for the applications equation is presented in table 7. What it suggests is, 
first, that lagged entry grades have a significant positive effect on current applications.  This 
suggests a Veblen good effect – in other words those institutions that recruit ‘more able’ 
students with higher A/AS points attract more applications. Applicants appear to be 
attracted to those institutions that require higher entry standards.  This line of argument is 
supported by a significant and positive elasticity for the quality ranking variable, suggesting 
the higher up the ‘league table’ an institution appears the more applications it receives.  The 
0.117 coefficient implies around a 70% advantage between the best and lowest ranked 
institutions.  The New/Old university dummy is significant and positive suggesting that on 
average post-92 universities achieve more applications. (Roughly a 56% advantage when the 
log point advantage of 0.45 is transformed as 1 – e.45.)  While many of the post-92 institutions 
appear in the lower part of the quality ranking ‘league table’ (see table 6), this sector achieves 
slightly more applications per institution than the pre-92 sector (see table 1).   However, 
whether this can be regarded as a reflection of success is a moot point because one reason 
why such places attract applications is for their `insurance’ effect.   Many of these applications 
turn out to be ephemeral and are not translated into acceptances. 
 
The Oxbridge dummy is significant and negative, as expected.  There appear to be strong 
regional influences on applications with the dummy coefficients being significant in all but 
two cases, the South East and Eastern regions.  Scotland and Wales both have negative 
coefficients, relative to Greater London.  The strongest positive regional impacts come from 
the institutions located in the East Midlands and the North West.  Notice that the regional 
dummies are quite powerful, suggesting that location matters rather more than prestige in 
attracting applicants.  Northern Ireland has a particularly strong impact, which may reflect a 
strong local demand. The year dummies do not have significant coefficients in any case – so 
the various doomsday predictions concerning the impact of tuition fees on applications are 
not readily apparent, at least at this early stage. 
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The instrumental variables estimation results of the acceptance equation are presented in 
table 8 (instruments used for prices and applications were lagged prices, regional dummies, 
quality ranking, MASN and Teaching Funding PER Head, Oxbridge, Newold and the time 
dummies).   Surprisingly, current entry grades do not appear to have a significant impact on 
acceptances.9  Both the teaching funding per head and MASN variables are significant and 
positive. This suggests that the allocation of additional student places by the funding councils  
(i.e. a rise in the MASN) leads to the institution accepting more students onto its courses, 
while those institutions that are awarded higher teaching funding per head have an incentive 
to accept more students.  
 
The MASN variable may be tracking some more complex dynamics alluded to in the 
theoretical discussion, but not directly tracked in the regression equation.  Consider a 
university that `over-recruits’ and is obliged to meet an unexpectedly high demand at its offer 
grades – the case of the horizontal short-run supply schedule.  It is probable that such success 
is rewarded in subsequent years by a higher MASN.  It may be that these strong short-run 
effects dominate the entry grade variable and accounts for its insignificance. 
 
The new/old university dummy is significant and positive, suggesting that  the post-92 sector 
accepts more students, a finding supported by table 1.  Oxbridge accepts fewer students.  
Only one dummy for the year of entry (1997-98) has a significant positive effect on 
acceptances.  There are two possible reasons for this result.  First, institutions were forward 
looking, in the sense they accepted more applicants in the year before tuition 
fees/maintenance loans were introduced to ensure recruitment was maximized, expecting a 
fall in applications the year after.  Secondly,  applicants avoided gap years to avoid the costs 
of going to university  and some applicants would accept second choices, rather than sitting 
out a year to improve their qualifications. 
Tables 7 & 8 near here 
                                                          
9 A random effects panel data model was also estimated, but this also revealed little success with a 
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 Concluding Comments 
A number of conclusions can be drawn from this investigation of the changing pattern of 
applications and acceptances to UK universities. First, many institutions have experienced 
uncertain demand for their ‘products’, with fluctuating applications and acceptances. 
Established patterns were disrupted by the introduction of tuition fees in 1998.  While some 
institutions suffered a fall in applications,  demand recovered in the last year of the sample.  
The main impact of tuition fees appears to have been a fall in the overall 
application/acceptance ratio from 6.67 to 6.27 in 1997/98, and tables 7 and 8 suggest that this 
fall was mainly being driven from the acceptance side.  Acceptances have grown at a faster 
rate than applications.  For the full sample of universities, applications grew by 0.34% from 
1996 to 1999, but acceptances increased by 10.16%.  Universities appear to have overestimated 
the negative demand side impact of tuition fees and perhaps there was a somewhat panic 
stricken over-reaction. 
 
A number of further factors may have added to the tuition fee effect on acceptances. First, 
institutions have become less selective in the face of limited growth in applications but with a 
need to maximize acceptances to maintain funding. Secondly, more applicants are achieving 
their conditional offer(s) – with a process of grade inflation operative in the face of little 
change in entry standards.   It is clear that factors specific to a given institution play an 
important role in determining the level of applications and acceptances. Specifically, the 
ranking (prestige) of an institution, its location in the UK and whether it is a pre-92 university 
or former polytechnic are all important factors. There is a well-defined Oxbridge effect, which 
discourages applications except from those who might be expected to achieve the highest 
qualifications. 
 
So what does this work suggest about the possibility of increasing participation in HE to meet 
government targets of a 50% participation overall in HE? The large rise in demand for HE 
                                                                                                                                                                      
instrumented entry grade and applications variable. 
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experienced in the 1980s is unlikely to be replicated in the future, as traditional sources of 
student supply have been exhausted.  Indeed, the 2001/02 round strongly suggests that 
universities are meeting target numbers by increasing the proportion accepted of those who 
apply.  The question is if the quality of provision can be maintained in the face of these 
trends, or whether  a substitution towards a well-defined two-tier system with an increasing 
proportion of HND/Foundation course type provision is necessary.  If applications are to be 
increased, recruitment strategies must aim to widen access to HE to applicants among 
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Figure 1: Number of students by level of course and mode of study 
Source: Copied from HEFCE (2001), ‘Supply and Demand in Higher Education’. Numbers are for all 
students for all HEIs in Great Britain. Years are academic years. 
 
Figure 2: Age Participation Index (API) by gender (1979-99) 
Notes: The Age Participation Index is the number of home domiciled under 21 initial entrants to full-time 
and sandwich undergraduate courses of HE, expressed as a proportion of the averaged 18-19 year-old 
population of Great Britain. From HEFCE (2001), ‘Supply and Demand in Higher Education’. 
 
Figure 3 HEI actual recruitment against MASN target 
 














































































































































































































































UK Applications Total UK applications by institution, 1996-97 to 1999-00. Source: 
UCAS. 
UK Acceptances Total UK acceptances by institution, 1996-97 to 1999-00. Source: 
UCAS. 
Entry grades Average A-level/AS level points achieved by students on entry to 
each institution, 1996-97 to 1999-00. Source: Times Higher 
Education Supplement (THES)., www.thesis.co.uk. 
Lagged Entry Grades Average A-level/AS level points achieved by students on entry to 
each institution , 1995-96 to 1998-99. Source: THES 
Quality ranking Quality ranking of institutions based on information published by 
the THES on 
1. average teaching quality score; 
2.  average RAE score; 
3.  student-staff ratio;  
4. graduate destinations (in terms of the proportion of 
graduates in work or further study 6 months after 
graduation) 
5. The proportion of firsts and upper-second class degrees 
awarded by the institution.  
 
Each component was ranked and then an overall rank computed 
with weights of 2.5 for teaching and 2 for research. This 
methodology follows that used in the Sunday Times League Table 
2001. 
Newold Dummy variable, which equals 1 if the institution is post-92 
institution and 0 if the institution is pre-92. 
Oxbridge Dummy variable, which equals 1 if the institution is either Oxford 
or Cambridge university and 0 otherwise. 
Regional dummies Equals 1 if the institution is located in the classified region and 0 
otherwise. 
Year dummies Equals 1 for the year of application and 0 otherwise. 
MASN Maximum Aggregate Student Number for each institution. 
Obtained from information published by HEFCE and the Scottish, 
Welsh and Northern Ireland Higher Education Funding Councils. 
TFPH A proxy for total teaching funding per head defined as total 
teaching funding divided by the MASN for each institution. 
Source: HEFCE and the Scottish, Welsh and Northern Ireland 

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Percentage growth in UK applications and acceptances by institution, 1996-1999 
 
















1 Brunel University 122.98 1 Brunel University 100.54 
2 University of Huddersfield 59.06 2 London Guildhall University 75.26 
3 
University of the West of 
England 36.21 3 
University of Central 
Lancashire 58.80 
4 UMIST 33.84 4 University of Ulster 52.80 
5 University of Bath 33.00 5 University of North London 40.00 
6 De Montfort University 30.84 6 University of Wales, Bangor 39.11 
7 Loughborough University 30.63 7 University of Essex 38.90 
8 
King's College, University 
of London 29.11 8 
University of the West of 
England 38.81 
9 Aston University 26.99 9 
Leeds Metropolitan 
University 37.81 
10 University of Warwick 19.42 10 
University of Northumbria at 
Newcastle 35.67 
11 University of Southampton 17.56 11 University of Brighton 34.09 
12 Imperial College 16.27 12 Imperial College 34.05 
13 
Leeds Metropolitan 
University 15.61 13 University of Southampton 32.26 
14 
University of Wales, 
Bangor 15.33 14 University of Westminster 31.74 
15 
Heriot-Watt University, 
Edinburgh 12.37 15 University of Huddersfield 29.49 
16 Coventry University 12.31 16 Sheffield Hallam University 29.20 
17 University of Brighton 11.94 17 
London School of Economics 
and Political Science 26.40 
18 University of Westminster 11.88 18 
Goldsmiths College, 
University of London 26.17 
19 University of Essex 11.15 19 
Liverpool John Moores 
University 25.41 
20 
London School of 
Economics and Political 
Science 10.64 20 University of Paisley 25.08 
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Table 2 (continued): 
Percentage growth in UK applications and acceptances by institution, 1996-1999 
 




















78 University of Manchester -11.41 78 Aston University -4.34 
79 University of St Andrews -12.33 79 University of Glamorgan -4.82 
80 University of Aberdeen -12.53 80 University College London -5.02 
81 University of East Anglia -12.60 81 
Heriot-Watt University 
Edinburgh -5.30 
82 University of Surrey -14.03 82 University of Sheffield -6.16 
83 
University of Kent at 
Canterbury -14.50 83 University of Hull -6.21 
84 University of Birmingham -15.00 84 University of Aberdeen -6.25 
85 
The Nottingham Trent 
University -15.21 85 University of Sussex -7.77 
86 University of Reading -15.50 86 
University of Newcastle 
Upon Tyne -8.00 
87 University of Stirling -16.35 87 University of Dundee -9.17 
88 Napier University -17.79 88 University of Sunderland -9.97 
89 University of Dundee -17.89 89 University of Luton -11.35 
90 
University of 
Wolverhampton -18.83 90 University of Portsmouth -11.89 
91 University of Sussex -19.44 91 Napier University -12.39 
92 Keele University -20.24 92 University of Bradford -13.28 
93 
Liverpool John Moores 
University -20.38 93 
South Bank University 
London -15.89 
94 
University of Wales, 
Lampeter -24.62 94 University of Plymouth -18.68 
95 University of Plymouth -26.57 95 
University of Wales, 
Lampeter -21.22 
96 
School of Oriental and 
African Studies -29.26 96 
Glasgow Caledonian 
University -27.73 
97 University of Luton -33.78 97 Thames Valley University -43.04 
Notes: series obtained from the raw data produced by UCAS (www.ucas.com). 
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 Table 3: UK applications to acceptances, 1996-1999 
 
rank institutions 1996-1997 1997-1998 1998-1999 1999-2000 
% growth: 
1996-1999 
Highest 20 institutions 
1 London School of Economics and Political Science 13.84 11.47 13.76 12.11 -12.47 
2 University of Bristol 11.12 11.77 11.82 11.80 6.12 
3 City University 10.07 11.24 10.10 9.77 -3.01 
4 University of Warwick 9.11 9.02 9.00 9.71 6.54 
5 University of Nottingham 12.25 12.15 11.79 9.45 -22.84 
6 King's College, University of London 8.19 8.61 9.24 9.00 9.95 
7 University of Sheffield 9.39 9.40 10.24 8.88 -5.49 
8 University College London, University of London 8.72 8.34 8.36 8.72 0.06 
9 University of York 9.20 9.21 9.72 8.62 -6.32 
10 Aston University 6.32 5.79 6.24 8.39 32.75 
11 University of Exeter 8.57 8.40 8.42 8.13 -5.06 
12 University of Bath 6.98 8.29 9.35 8.00 14.69 
13 University of Ulster 11.40 8.77 8.10 7.81 -31.52 
14 University of Manchester 8.37 9.26 9.02 7.69 -8.22 
15 Thames Valley University 4.08 4.29 7.69 7.64 87.33 
16 University of Newcastle Upon Tyne 7.60 7.78 7.67 7.59 -0.16 
17 University of Reading 8.92 7.88 8.04 7.53 -15.50 
18 University of Leeds 7.57 8.17 8.03 7.49 -1.08 
19 University of Birmingham 8.63 8.56 7.70 7.35 -14.84 
20 University of Southampton 8.26 7.39 6.68 7.34 -11.11 
Lowest 20 institutions 
78 Staffordshire University 5.47 4.75 4.86 4.74 -13.31 
79 University of Wales, Bangor 5.59 4.71 4.27 4.63 -17.10 
80 University of Essex 5.66 4.45 4.56 4.53 -19.98 
81 University of Sunderland 4.26 4.05 4.13 4.40 3.35 
82 University of East London 5.92 5.40 5.03 4.40 -25.73 
83 University of Teesside 4.59 4.01 4.11 4.28 -6.78 
84 University of Wales, Swansea 4.44 4.19 4.73 4.28 -3.67 
85 Anglia Polytechnic University 4.31 4.13 4.56 4.24 -1.60 
86 University of Wolverhampton 5.94 4.55 4.64 4.21 -29.06 
87 University of Lincoln and Humberside 3.85 2.92 3.24 4.16 8.11 
88 London Guildhall University 6.82 4.93 4.67 4.13 -39.37 
89 University of Wales, Aberystwyth 4.18 3.74 4.03 4.12 -1.54 
90 School of Oriental and African Studies 6.22 4.83 4.61 4.06 -34.69 
91 The Robert Gordon University 5.26 4.28 4.23 4.05 -23.12 
92 University of Abertay Dundee 4.08 4.42 3.77 3.78 -7.22 
93 University of Paisley 3.90 3.04 3.33 3.35 -14.12 
94 Cambridge University 3.53 3.36 3.19 3.30 -6.49 
95 University of Wales, Lampeter 3.06 2.85 3.62 2.93 -4.32 
96 Oxford University 2.81 2.73 2.63 2.73 -2.69 
97 University of Central Lancashire 4.19 3.36 3.90 2.66 -36.44 
 For all 97 institutions 6.67 6.27 6.26 6.07 -8.99 





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 5: Average A/AS points by institution, 1996-1999 
 
rank institutions 1996-1997 1997-1998 1998-1999 1999-2000 
% growth: 
1996-1999 
Highest 20 institutions 
1 Cambridge University 29.6 29.7 29.7 29.8 0.68 
2 Oxford University 28.7 29.2 29.3 29.4 2.44 
3 LSE 27.3 27.7 27.9 28.3 3.66 
4 Imperial College 27.3 27.5 27.8 28.0 2.56 
5 University of Warwick 25.1 25.9 25.9 27.0 7.57 
6 University of Edinburgh 25.9 26.4 26.2 26.5 2.32 
7 University of Nottingham 26.1 25.9 26.2 26.1 0.00 
8 Bristol 25.6 26.4 26.7 26.0 1.56 
9 University of York 23.8 24.5 25.4 26.0 9.24 
10 Bath 22.8 24.4 25.3 25.6 12.28 
11 University College London 23.4 25.1 25.3 25.3 8.12 
12 Durham 24.8 25.2 25.1 25.1 1.21 
13 University of Sheffield 24.8 25 25.8 25.1 1.21 
14 King's College 22.7 23.3 24.7 24.5 7.93 
15 University of Glasgow 22.8 23.5 24.1 24.2 6.14 
16 University of Wales College of Cardiff 22.3 22.8 23.3 24.0 7.62 
17 University of Manchester 23.6 24 24 24.0 1.69 
18 University of St Andrews 24 25 23.3 24.0 0.00 
19 UMIST 21 22.5 22.6 23.7 12.86 
20 Birmingham 24.1 24.3 24.6 23.6 -2.07 
Lowest 20 institutions 
78 Coventry University 12.3 13.3 13.3 13.4 8.94 
79 University of Teesside 11.9 12.7 13.1 13.4 12.61 
80 University of Westminster 13 13 13.8 13.2 1.54 
81 University of Glamorgan 11.9 11.9 13.1 13.1 10.08 
82 University of Lincoln and Humberside 12 12.3 13.4 13.1 9.17 
83 Anglia Polytechnic University 12.4 12.4 13.8 13.0 4.84 
84 De Montfort University 12.8 13.4 13.3 13.0 1.56 
85 Staffordshire University 12.6 13.3 13.1 12.8 1.59 
86 University of Luton 12.1 10 11.2 12.5 3.31 
87 South Bank University London 10.5 11.1 11.8 12.5 19.05 
88 University of Sunderland 11.7 12.2 12.2 12.4 5.98 
89 University of Wolverhampton 12.9 12.8 12.2 12.1 -6.20 
90 University of East London 11.5 12 11.7 12.0 4.35 
91 University of Greenwich 11.8 11.6 12.1 12.0 1.69 
92 Thames Valley University 11.1 9.3 10.6 12.0 8.11 
93 London Guildhall University 11.8 12.3 11.3 11.7 -0.85 
94 Middlesex University 12.5 13 13.1 11.4 -8.80 
95 Napier University 12.8 13.9 12.6 11.2 -12.50 
96 University of North London 8.5 8.7 11.1 10.8 27.06 
97 University of Paisley 11 10.6 12.5 10.8 -1.82 
 Average 17.64 18.23 18.52 18.68 5.89 
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Table 6: Quality Rankings by institution 
 
Highest 20 institutions 
 
rank  1996 1997 1998 1999 
1 Cambridge University 97 95 97 97 
2 Imperial College 64 94 94 96 
3 Oxford University 95 96 96 95 
4 University of York 87 88 87 93 
5 University of St Andrews 96 87 88 93 
6 University of Nottingham 88 82 90 92 
7 
London School of Economics and 
Political Science 89 97 95 91 
8 University of Edinburgh 94 80 90 90 
9 Loughborough University 83 62 71 89 
10 University of Bristol 90 90 89 88 
11 Lancaster University 92 84 92 87 
12 University of Durham 93 93 72 86 
13 University of Manchester 86 89 82 85 
14 
University College London, 
University of London 82 80 86 84 
15 University of Birmingham 84 85 81 83 
16 University of Leeds 44 73 75 82 
17 University of Cardiff 79 79 85 81 
18 University of Hull 80 60 73 80 
19 University of Bath 91 76 67 79 
20 University of Essex 62 70 68 78 
Lowest 20 institutions 
 
78 University of Greenwich 35 41 17 20 
79 University of Glamorgan 17 31 26 19 
80 Staffordshire University 12 32 22 17 
81 Anglia Polytechnic University 29 22 10 17 
82 
University of Central England in 
Birmingham 4 28 14 15 
83 University of Central Lancashire 9 9 23 15 
84 Liverpool John Moores University 28 10 15 14 
85 University of Abertay Dundee 15 7 7 13 
86 University of Hertfordshire 22 20 18 12 
87 University of East London 21 18 12 11 
88 University of Huddersfield 56 25 21 10 
89 Leeds Metropolitan University 46 14 8 9 
90 London Guildhall University 13 13 11 8 
91 Bournemouth University 6 1 2 7 
92 University of Lincoln & Humberside 38 3 1 6 
93 University of Derby 11 6 5 5 
94 University of Paisley 7 33 13 4 
95 South Bank University London 1 4 6 3 
96 University of Teesside 5 5 4 2 
97 Thames Valley University 2 2 3 1 
Notes: The quality rankings  were obtained from raw data published on each institution’s average TQA score; average RAE score; 
graduate destinations; proportion of firsts and 2:1s and student-staff ratio/ TQA scores were given a weight of 2.5 and research a 
weighting of 2. Data ranked on the basis of the 1999 figures.
 
Table 7: OLS estimation results- 
application equation 
 
Regressand: UK Applications 
Number of 
observations = 387 
F( 18, 368) = 29.52 





constant 7.22 13.33 
Lagged entry grades 0.578 3.05 
Quality ranking 0.117 3.71 
Newold 0.450 4.07 
Oxbridge -0.487 -5.34 
Regional dummies   
Scotland -0.282 -2.94 
Wales -0.558 -2.90 
Northern Ireland 0.590 4.54 
North East 0.185 2.24 
North West 0.427 3.94 
Yorkshire & 
Humberside 0.302 3.04 
West Midlands 0.178 1.93 
East Midlands 0.481 5.56 
Eastern -0.091 -1.04 
South East -0.132 -1.27 
South West 0.286 3.06 
Year dummies   
1997-98 0.001 0.02 
1998-99 -0.026 -0.39 
1999-00 -0.042 -0.60 
 
Table 8: Instrumental variables estimation results 
- acceptances equation 
 




F( 3, 383) = 457.3 







Constant -1.924 -2.90 
Entry grades -0.075 -0.71 
Teaching funding per head 0.181 1.62 
Maximum Aggregate Student Number 0.606 6.26 
Newold 0.087 2.27 
Oxbridge  0.240 2.58 
UK applications 0.310 4.17 
1997-98 0.068 2.99 
1998-99 0.020 0.61 
1999-00 0.038 1.07 
Note:  Variables are described in Fig.(5). 
